UNITED STATES DISTF~ICTCOURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PUEBLO OF SANDIA,
Plaintiff
v.

BRUCE H. BABBITT, ET AL.,
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CIV. NO. 1:94CV02624HHG

5

Defendants.
INTERVENOR-DEFENDANT BERNALELO COUNTY'S
lMEiMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF
C O W Y ' S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Intervenor-defendant Bemalillo County, New Mexico: (the "County") herewith nates its
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Pueblo of Sandia (filed June 26,
1996)("Pueblo'3 and joins in with and adopts the United States' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (filed June 27, 1997)("United States'

Cross-Motion"). Further, Defendant County moves the Court to gmit it summary judgment on the
same grounds on which it opposes Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion."

Yln rrsponx to the record review pmcding convened by the Cow in this matter (Opinion Dec. 10,1996).
Defendant Bcmalillo County specifically adopts and joins the United States' contention in its Cross-Motion that the
a d m i n i i v e record h o n m a t a that Seremy Hodel's decision not to giant the Pueblo's claim was fully ~ p ~ o n c d
by the record and was neither arbitray nor capricious, and that Secretary Babbit's inaction on the Pueblo's claim does
not connirute reviewable fmal agency action andlor was not arbitray and capricious. As diwuued in greater detail in
Defendant County's Cmu-Motion for Summary Judgment filed hmvritb, the extra-record rnatcrials rrfermccd in the
inrtvlt opposition and cross-motion are submiad in the fim insranee sr post-hoc eonf%natim of the basis for SsrcQV
Hodel's decision and should be considered as background u m f h a h of hi actions at issue. In the al&v;C.
these
ex-record
mamiak arc submitted in response to the cxua-record umrriak relied on by the Pueblo in i s amMay
judgment filings. to the e m r such r e l i i is accepted for tonsidetation by the C&
in that car+ the facts cmd herein
entitle Defendant to summary judgment on the c l a m originally sswned by Plaintiff in io Amended Complaint

-

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Intervenors adopt the summation of procedural history set out in the United States'
Opposition and note in addition that the Court p t e d Intervenors' respective motions to intervene
in this case by order dated February 2 1, 1997.

STANDARD FOR GRANT OF SUM%WRYJUDGMENT
.Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 17,322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liber?, Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986).

"One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims." Celorex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
Further, while the court must view the record and draw all rehsonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of the non-moving party, where a fact is in dispute, the non-moving party must
show that the fact is marerial, and that the dispute is genuine. Kalekirisros v. CTF Hotel ~Ugmt.

Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1987). No genuine issue of material fact exists "where the record
as a whole would not lead a rational trier of fact to tind for the non-moving party." M'hifa Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. "If
evidence is m m l y 'colorable' or 'not significantly probative' summary judgment may be granted."

~bfacphersonv. Searle & Co, 775 F.Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1991). More specifically, the mere existence
of some evidence in support of the non-moving party will not be sufficient to support a denial of a
motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable the trier of fact to
reasonably tind for the non-moving party. Witco Corp. v. B e e h i s , 38 F.3d 682,686 (3d Cu. 1994).

Thus, once the movant has produced evidence in support of summary judgment, the non-

moving party cannot rest on mere allegations or denials, or on conjecture, speculation, or suspicions.

See e.g., Winn v. United Press Inr'l, 938 F . Supp. 39,45 (D.D.C. 1996). affd, 1997 WL 404959
(D.C. Cir. 1997); CBS. Inc. v. Henkin, 803 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (citing cases).
Notably, the non-movihp party must come forward with more than a mere scintilla of evidence in
suppon of its position, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, and must establish that there is more than "some
3

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." ~Marsushita,475 U.S. at 574.

INTRODUCTION
In 1858, Congress, implementing
.. the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, confinned the 1748
Spanish grant of land to the Pueblo that is the focus of this action. While the Pueblo claims that the
1748 grant entitles it to additional land (the "Claim Area"'), significant new research (outside the
administrative record)establishes that the Pueblo has already gceived more than the land provided
by the 1748 grant. This new research confirms that Solicitor Tarr's conclusion rejecting the Pueblo's
claim was fully justified. The grant conveyed a "formal pueblo," adjusted for certain topographical
banien, and the directional indication in the grant ("and on the can, the siena madre called Sandia.7
did not signify the crest of Sandia Mountain as a border of the grant area as contended by Plaintiff.
The following shows how the Afidavit of Stanley M. Hordes, Exhibit F to Federal
Defendants' Statement of Genuine Issues

. ..(copy attached as Exhibit 3 to this Memorandum)

( h m i n a i t a "Hordes Aff!&vitl') and Dr. Hordes' Repon, History of the Boundnries of rhe Pueblo

ofSandia, 1748-1860 (March 1, 1996) ("Hordes Report," Exhibit 1 hereto) authoritatively confirm
the basis of the conclusions of Solicitor T a n and Secretary Hodel's adoption thereof. The following
also distinguishes the present case from the decision in Pueblo of Taos on grounds of the concrete

.

private interests threatened by the Plaintiffs claim for relief in this case. Further, to the exrent that
Plaintiffs Opposition io Federal Defendant's Cross-Motion effectively ignores the record-review
nature of this proceeding and relies heavily on em-record materials in an argument of the purported
merits, these authorities refute Plaintiffs merits arguments.
DISCUSSION
A.
'
t

'.

T h e 1748 Land Grant Contemplates a Formal Pueblo and Does Not Support
Plaintiffs Claim
1.

The Intent of the Legislature is Controlling

4 s a threshold maner, it is well established that in the conmuction of statutes, the legislative
will is the conmlling factor. E.g.. UnitedSmes v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S.50,53 (1941)
("The question ... in any problem of statutory consmction, is the intention of the enacting body");

UnitedSrrrres v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976) (duty of the c o w is tc give faithful meaning to the
language Congress adopted in light of legislative purpose in enacting statute); ~Vorfolk

Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. C&P Telephone Co.. 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983).

By way of

comparison, where legislation affecting the boundaries of Indian reservations is at issue -that is,
legislation clearly implicating the government's fiduciary responsibility toward the Indiansambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians. RosebudSioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584,
586 (1977). However, even in such case. the "'face of the Act.' the 'surrounding circumstances.'

and the 'legislative history,' are to be examined with an eye toward determining what congressional
intent was." Id at 587 (citation omitted).
With regard to the focus of this case, namely the 1748 grant of a f o d pueblo by the

Spanish goyemmmt to the Pueblo of Sandia,Con-

provided in 1854 that to effectuate the 1848

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Surveyor Gtncral, under supmrision of the Secretary b f the

Interior, would "ascertain the origin, nature, character, and extent of all claims to lands under the
'laws ... of Spain and biexico. Act to Establish the Offices of Surveyor-General..., 3 8,33 Cong., 1st
Sess. (July 22, 1854). Thereupon, Congress would confirm bonafide giants and give full effect to
the Treaty. Id.
Further, in 1858; Congress passed a law to confirm the land claims of various pueblos.

It

provided chat "the Pueblo land claims in the Territory of New Mexico designated in the corrected
-1
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lists as- ... Pueblo of Sandia in the county of Bemalillo ...be, and they are hereby, confirmed." 1 1
Stat. 374 @ec. 22. 1958). The intent of this statute, known as "An Act to contirm the Land Claims

' of certain Pueblos and Towns in the Tenitory of New Mexico," on its face was confirmation of born
fide land grants recognized pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.
Plaintiff has accordingly acknowledged that its claim derives h m and depends on the tams
of the underlying 1748 Spanish grant. E.g.. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment at 3-4 (July 7, 1996) ("The 1748 royal p t , by its express terms, includes all the claim
area.. .. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ratified all land titles which had been made by the Spanish
sovereigns"'); letter of P. Grossi to F. Ryan (Mar. 14, 1986) (Adrnin. Rec. f! 188). However, the
Hordes research, fully confirming Solicitor Tan's conclusions, shows in faathat the 1748 gmnt does
not support the Pueblo's claim.

2.

T h e 1748 Land Grant Conveyed a "Formal Pueblon

The Decree granting lands to the Pueblo of Sandia clearly evidences the intention that the
new entity be considered as a "pueblo formal de indios," consistent with the practice of the Spanish

.

Crown in granting land to pueblos in New Mexico. Hordes Report at 5.y In the formal Act of
Possession in which Lieutenant General Busramante measured out the grant, he stated that
"the conceded leagues were measured for the formal pueblo," indicating that 5,000
varas were to be surveyed in each direction from the center of the settlement. He
began to mark off the 5,000 varas that would have comprised the league
measurement extending to the west, but after only 1,410 varas his pa& was impeded
by the Rio Grande. In order to compensate the pueblo for the shonfall of 3,650
varas, Bustamante decided to add lands to both the north and south boundary equally,
so as not to cause prejudice to either one of the neighboring Spanish settlements of
Bemalillo and Alameda.2'
-7
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Hordes Report at 6-7.
.

The lieutenant general also ordered that markers be placed "on the north, facing the point of
the Caiiada, commonly known as del Agua; and on the south, facing the mouth of thc Caiiada de

Juan Tabovo; and on the east the Sierra Madre called Sandia. .

. . ." Id at 7. Dr. Hordes notes that

"[tlhe description of both the north and south boundaries in themoriginal1748 grant documents also
indicated that the eastern boundary was located to the west of the Caiiada del Agua and the Caiiada
de Juan Tabovo, geographical features located in the foothills of the Sandia Mountains. Therefore,
according to the original 1748 granting documents, the eastem boundary of the pueblo was not the

I ~ h De a m &a

the governor's intention to "give commirrion as full and sufficient ar is neccsary in such

carato Lieutenant G m m l Don Bmrardo de Bunamante. so that.. .he pass to rhe place of Sandii and then conduct
an inspection. calculation and e c o g n h c c of the said sile. execufing a distribution of lands. wafers. pamtrr and.
wafering places that conapond to a formal I n d i o n p b l o . according to the prescription of the royal law." Id at S-6
(emphasis supplied).

.

V. Whiting translation of the 1748 Spanish grdnt documem. which Pwmtiff refen 10as the
x ~ h David
e
'official translation." Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants' Memonndum in Opposition- a 9pmrim. likewise p ~ s h t e s
the words describing the measurement of the grant with "the leagues. granted to a formal pueblo, w m mcasmxd...."
Admin. Rec. f11804.

crest of the mountain, but, rather, a north-south line located to the west of the foothills of the Sierra
Madre de Sandia." H6rdes Affidavit at 7 8 (emphasis in original).g
Possibly due to the weakness of its position under the the language of the 1748 -grant, the
Pueblo now relies heavily for support on the wording in rhe translation by David V. Whiting of the
1748 Spanish land grant ("Whiting uanslation") instead of on the grant document. E.g.. Plaintiffs
Reply'to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgmen~and
'i

.I

Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment C'Plaintiff s Reply") at
10 ("...Whiting set the eastern boundary of the grant as the 'main ridge' of the Sandia Mounrains").g

' However, Dr. Hordes has established that the Whiting translation of the May 16, 1748 Act of
Possession contains key errors, including using language that was not contained either in the original
Spanish document, nor even in Whiting's own transcription into mod& Spanish letters of the
original archaic Spanish handwriting. Hordes Aflidavir at 7 10.g The Hordes Report discusses in
detail the nature of inaccuracies in the Whiting translation. Hordes Repon at 16-20. The effect of

*The Hordes Repon notes that the insuunions issued by Surveyor General Pelham to Surveyor Garretson
pursuant to the 1858 act specifically insuucted how to measure gants calling for measurement of a formal pueblo.
Hordes Repon at 24. The rcpon also m i e w s in derail rccordc of 19th Century litigation involving propenies
neighboring the pueblo. These proceedings clearly recognized the formal pueblo m r c oithe pueblo's botmdarics.
Hordes Repon at b 1 3 . Dr. Hordes concludes that "(b]y the close of the Mexican period of New Mexico history. it is
clear that almost all concerned panics Sandia Pueblo, their non-Indian neigkbors. and Spanish and Mexican
govmunmel officials defined the land rights of the pueblo in terms of a 4-qmrc-league arc&as shaped by the 1748
land grant and Acrof Possession." Id at 13-14 (footnote omined). The one-league leng~hofthe e a n m boundary of
the pueblo in the center of the smlement "would place the eastern boundary within the river valley. well shon of the
foothills of the Sandia Mountains." Id at 14.

-

-

YAs a m a w of hWhiting merely frf?~It?fcdthegrant as rcning the eastern boundary at the "main ridge"
of the Sandia Mountains. As a rclued mmr, the Pueblo had earlier asserted chat the a m r in the survey war in fact
the mulc of its having followed "a flawed ('Whiting') mrulation o f a spurious grant documenr The genuine grant
document was available ...but apparently was ignored." Leuer of P. Grossi to F. Ryan (Mar.14. 19861, Admin. Rec.
#188.

...

6/ln conaas~to Whiting's mmrhrion, W i g ' s nunscription of the archaic Spanish handrvriting of tke grant
was very Faithful m the text. Hordes Repon at 16.

.

the mistranslation was to add over 7,000 acres to the Pueblo's lands in excess of the amount
comprising a formal pueblo. Hordes Affidavit at 7 10."
Funher, with regard to Plaintiffs claim that the wording of the 1748 grant document, "on
the east, the Sierra Madre called Sandia," places the eastern boundary at the crest of the Sandia
Mountains, e.g., plaintiffs Reply at 9, Dr. Hordes explains that the reference to Sierra Madre de
Sandia is merely a directional indication: the authorities laid out the boundaries of the pueblo as
-1
8.

much as possible according to those of a "pueblo formal," with the -ern

boundary extending one

league from the center of the pueblo, reaching just about to the foothills. "As an additional general

' reference point, the Spanish royal official who established the boundaries pointed to the mountain
range of the 'Sierra Madre de Sandia' as lying to the east. Thus, the designation of the eastern
boundary of the pueblo as a point extending one league towards the foothills is fully consistent with
a broad, general designation of the eastem boundary as the Sierra Madre." Hordes Afidavit at 7 10
(emphasis original)."

PMeanwhile, the issue of inaccuracies in the Whiting trarulation and in the underlying documents had
previously bem raised with Solicimr Tan. .&.&. Tan Opinion at 2-3 n.2. Admin. Rec. 11660-61; Lener of P. Gmssi
to F. Ryan (Mar. 14, 1986) (referring to "a flawed ('Whiting') manslation of a spurious gant document"). Admin. Rec.
L 188.
yln the words of Solicitor Tarr,
Rather than reading as a whole the Act of Possession laying out the Pueblo. the Pueblo focuses
entirely on the l i d rmrmce of the quoted parapph ofthe A n of Possession. The third sentence
memorializes Bustamante's direction to place markm of mud and stone the height of a man to
perpruanthe memories and designations as he hrd already laid rhrm out on the ground. Burcamante
o d d h a t t h a e markm k placed -on the nonh facing the point ofthc canada which is commonly
called'del Agua.' and on the south
the mouth of the Canada de Juan Tabovo. and on the east
the s i e m made called Sandia

...

....

(TJhe issue in chis maner is not over the meaning of rhe phnue 'the r i m Mdrr called SmdQ" that
is, whether the Spanish term translated "main ridge" by Whidng refm fo the foothill or the crest of
m h e mountains is a call m a Mnval feaatrr
the mountains. Rather, the issue is haher the refas a boundary or is a d i i o n a l reference to a natural feature facing which the monument was w be
placed.

(continued...)

Clearly, the 1748 Spanish land grant intended to convey and explicitly conveyed a formal
Pueblo, contrary to Plaintiffs contentions. This conclusion of the Hordes Report confims the
earlier conclusion by Solicitor Tarr?
3.

USierraitfadre" Refers to a mountain Range, Not a Main Ridge

Further, the Hordes Affidavit refutes the contention in an affidavit of Plaintiffs expert that
"Sierra Madre de Sandia" can be translated to mean the main ridge of Sandia Peak.
.l

.'

An examination of Spanish language and etymological dictionaries from the
eighteenth to the twentieth centuries shows a m n g consensus among authorities that
sierra referred to a mountain range, not the highest point of the mountain range.
Neither did the primary archival documentation from the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries present-tlje terms sierra or Sierra Madre in any other than a
general loca!ional context. Nowhere in the contemporary documentation could
citation be found to the Sierra Madre or Sierra de Sandia as the crest of the
mountain or the "main ridge."
Hordes Affidavit at 19 (emphasis in original). The Hordes Report discusses in detail the proper
translation of the term "Sierra Madre" as referring to a mountain range. Id. at 27-36.u

g( ...continued)

Tam Opinion at 20 (Admin Rcc. 81678).

-wEg.. Tarr Opinion at 19 CThese [spanish gnnt]documents, therefore, leave linle doubt that the S p k h
intended to grant a formal pueblo of as close to four square leagues as possible to the Sandia Pueblo"). A d m i Rec.
#1677.

* ~ r . Horde5 has also httdPlaintiffs claim that the maanmt of the castem boundary of the nei&borin~
Elena Galleps land grant supponed Plaintiffs claim. Eg., Plaintiffs Summary Judgment memorandum at 18. Dr.
Hordes notes, however. that
the Sandia Grant and the Elena Gallqos Grant differ in two fundamental ~speco.F i i the language
of the grants arc significantly different with mpcct a,the spccificiry of the boundary calk %on4
the nature of the pueblo grant was d i i c f fmm granu to non-Indii [with the Gallegos Grant
specifying the boundary as the "Sivm & W i a " 7 .Sandia representeda formalpueblo grant, which
adhered to the limitation of a four-square-league .reqas opposed u, Elena Gallqos. which had no
such express limitation,
Hordes Repon at 32. See generalfly d i m i o n in Hordes Repon at 32-36.

.

In sum, the 1748 Spanish land grant to the Pueblo provides no support for Plaintiffs claim
tothe Claim .&ea. Arfhival, historical and etymological research establish that the pueblo in fact
received more land pursuant to the 1858 statute and consequent survey than was intended by the
1748 grant. Accordingly, the resurvey sought by Plaintiff - o f the eastern boundary of the grantwould be a hollow exercise. If resurveyed today, the s w e y would necessarily consider an accurate
translation of the 1748 land grant confumed by the 1859 statute and would not rely on the Whiting
-t
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translation in light of its clear inaccuracies. The resulting resurvey would not support the Pueblo's
entitlement to the Claim Area and would merely confirm that the Pueblo already has more property
' than it was entitled to.

B.

-

T h e Private Property and Local Governmental Interests Threatened by the
. . ' this Case from Pueblo o f Taos
Pueblo's C-l

Plaintiff relies heavily on the decision in Pueblo of Taos v. A n h , 475 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C.
1979). as purported suppon for Plaintiffs contentions in this case.w That case is, however, readily
distinguishable inrer alia on grounds that the Court, in mandating application of an existing new
survey to land that had been acquired in bust for the Pueblo of Taos, relied on the lack of an impact
of such action on private properties.
The Court in Pueblo of Taos held that cases holding that surveys are conclusive upon the
United States and on patentees in the interest of quieting title did not apply in the case before it, in

.

u'lndced, in coneast to i s effort since the time of m amendment of the instant Complaint to model h e relief
it seek on that at issue in Pueblo of Toas (ie. imposition of a w t on federal land in the Pueblo's favor). the Pueblo
formerly and in io original Complaint, sought more. Thus. in 1986, the Pueblo approached thc Departmmt of the
Interior to "regin undisputed title to" the Ckim Area. ( L e r of P. Gmssi to F. Ryan @OI) (Mar. 14.1986) (Admin
Rec. # 186- 195. at 187). To the same effect, in is original Complaint, it sought ht relief a resurvey and title to the Claim
Area. If not wholly abandoned by amendment of is Complaint m bemr fit within the pmmetm of dtc Pueblo 4 T o m
decision. such claim would be rubjm to the Quiet Title A n as wu possibly recognized by Associate SolicitorVohnan
See Admiin. Rcc. g 755 (Vollman memorandum "doa not address whether the Pueblo could prevail in a lawsuit. given
applicable statutes of limitations").

which private parties had not relied on challenged measurements or where adjusting challenged
boundaries would be inequitable in light of such reliance. 475 F. Supp. at 367. It noted that in the
case before it, "[nlo private parties [had] ever relied on the erroneous boundary." Id.
In the present case, by conmt, any granting of the relief sought by Plaintiff would directly
impact the private inholdings within the Claim Area.= This fact raises significant equities not
addressed by the Court in Pueblo of Taos. For example, Foust v. Lujan, 942 F.2d 712 (10th Cir.
-i

1991). cerr. denied, 503 U.S. 981 (1992), concerned an appeal of an Interior Department denial of

an application to correct error in a patent, w h m the correction would affect Indian land. The court
' rejected the agency's contention that .its fiduciaj duty to the Indians precluded the relief, pointing
out the countervailing private interest at issue: "[tlhe fact that the Secretary is vested with
responsibilities both to correct patent erron and to act as trustee for the Indians cannot operate
against patentees who'have Indians, rather than non-Indians, as neighbors." Id at 715. To similar
effect, the strong policy of repose underlying the Quiet Title Act also informs the case law on the
conclusiveness of patents and underlying surveys. Thus, in De Gcryer v. Banning, 167 U.S. 723.743
(1 897), the Court held that

u ~ o rthis reason, the Pueblo has repeatedly mced thn it has no inin the private holdings within the
Claim Area Ex..Plaintiffs Reply at 2, n.1. However. Plaintiffs proffered waiver is ineffecfivewithout more. The
Nonintercourse Acf provide that "[nlo purchase. grant.l e m . or other conveyance of lands. or of any title or claim
dueIo, from any Indian nation or uibe of Indians shall be of any validity in law or quiry, unless the same be made by
frcaty or convention entered into pursuant to the C d t i o n . " 25 U.S.C. 9 177 (emphasis supplied). Funher. the
Pueblo Lands Act includes a section dealing with conveyances of Pueblo title, providing that "no sale. gant. I m e of
any character, or other conveyance of lands. or any title or claim thvlro, made by any pueblo as a community. or m y
Pueblo Indian living in a community of Pueblo Indians. in the Stan of New Mexico, shall be of any validiry in law or
inquiry unless the same be fmt approved by the Seeremy of the Interior. 43 Star 641-642 (emphasis added). As a
related maacr. Congress has delegated to rhe Smt~uy
of the Inferior authority u, appmve ccrrain mnsactions involving
Indian land. Eg., 25 U.S.C.99312.379. Absent such approval by the Smetary, real live private inkrests m a i n
threatened by the Pueblo's claims in this acfion.

-

the patent having been accepted by the patent-, and being uncanceled, the plaintiffs
in this action, claiming under the patentees, cannot recov er lands not embraced by
it, even if such lands are embraced by the lines established by the decree of
confirmation, the conclusive presumption being that the patent correctly locates the
lands covered by the confirmed grant.

See also United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 1908 (1908) (under 43
U.S.C. $1 166, United States could not sue to vacate or annul patents more than six years after
issuance).u' In short, it is established that private parties should be entitled to rely on applicable
.7
%.

patents and surveys, notably ones issued more than 130 years previously,& and this consideration
is the basis of a significant distinction between this case and Pueblo of Taos.
The Pueblo's statement that it has no interest in the private holdings within the Claim Area,

e.g.. Plaintiffs Reply at 2 n.1, might be viewed-as addressing the important distinction that the
presence of private parties creates between this case and Pueblo of Taos. However, as noted above.
Plaintiffs proffered waiver of claims is ineffective without more; the Pueblo cannot alienate
property or a claim to property without approval by the Secretary of Interior.*'

Absent such

approval by the Secretary, real live private interests remain threatened by the Pueblo's claims in this
action. Funher, the proferred waiver wholly fails to address the many vital interests of Bernalillo
County in the Claim Area (beyond the imporcant property intemts of its citizens) which are
threatened by Plaintiffs claims herein. As set out in greater detail in the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Bernalillo County's Motion to Intervene as Defmdant (June 29,1995).
~ 3 1 1 t s cCe m m v. UnitedStmes. 261 U.S. 219 (1923) (suiu for the benetit of Indims may be allowed in
some cares).
&cornprm Tam Opinion a 2 6 (admin. Res. Y 1684) ("the failure to challenge the pumt until 1983. some 120
yean after iu issuance, is the most troubling cimrmtanrial evidence involving this claim. The Pueblo apparently
sYened no claim m the 10.000 disputed axes prior to 1983. As a consequence, the Pueblo's eastern boundary remained
essentially unquestioned for over I20 yean...").
U'See discussion in footnote 12. supra
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the Claim Area comprises open spaces, including a network of recreational trails, that constimte an
imponant component of'the County's established open space management plan. The County also
exercises police powers relating to water, waste, pollution, and animal and pest control in che
interests of public health and safety on private lands within the Claim Area. These interests,
including notably the police powers, could be seriously impacted by a
, relief.

-*8,

rant of Plaintiffs requested

see id. at 2-j, 12-11, and h e y bear consideration in this case. E.g.. 43 U.S.C. $772 (no

resurvey of public lands "shall be so executed as to impair the bona fide rights or claims of any
claimant"); Menopolitan FVater Dist. of S.Catifornia v. United States, 628 F.Supp. 1018, 1021 (S.D.
Cal. 1986) (words "'any claimant', indicate that Congress intended to protect the entire specaum of
rights of claimanfs that might be affected by a land resurvey"), remandedon other grounds, 830 F.2d
I39 (9th Cir. 1987). crffd sub nom Calfornia v. UnitedSfates, 109 S.Ct. 2273 (1989). These kinds
of interests, funfier diitinguish the Pueblo of Taos decision, which considered no interests of this
kind.

C.

The Pueblo's Delay in Challenging the Survey Miiitatcs Against a Grant of

Even if an error in a patent (or the incorporated survey) were established, "the other
circumstances of the case must be examined to determine whether considerations of equity and
justice wanant amendment of the patent Four v. Lujan. 942 F.2d at 717. in that case, in which a

tribe objected to the c o d o n of a patent, the court specifically cited the Indians' failure to object
earlier as barring their current arguments:

...[t]he Indians took no action with respect to the land until the early 1980s. some
fifty years after the remaining undisposcd land in the area was conveyed to them.
,
failure to take
Although a d v m e possession does not run against the i n d i a ~their
some action. against the alleged trespass for nearly forty years' is a relevant
consideration in evaluating the equities of the case
f they did know of the

..m

-

mistake but did nothing about it. ... they cannot assm now that the land is so valuable
that an exchange would prejudice their interests.
In the present case, the record establishes that the Pueblo has been on notice of the boundary
of their land grant since at least 1864, whtn the patent issued. The Pueblo waited 120 years to raise
this issue, nowithstanding numerous mtutorily-afforded oppormnities to obtain judicial review of
their claims. The Pueblo has previously also actively pursued litigation concerning other matters
affecting its boundaries. See Tarr Opinion at 8, Admin. Rec. $1666. The Claim Area was also
resurveyed in 1915, resulting in ratification of the Clements survey, with no objection &om the
Pueblo. Id (citing UnitedStares v. Abouselman, No. 1839 (D.N.M. Dec. 16, 1929)). In addition,
the Pueblo dealt in detail and over many yean with the Forest Service without objection. Moreover,
on information and belief, it did not object to the 1978 designation under the Endangmd American
Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. $1 132, designating some 8900 acres of the roughly 10,000 acre Claim
Area as the Sandia MountainWildemess under the adminimation of the Secretary of Agriculture.
Finally, on information and belief, it did not object to subdivision of the Claim Area for conmuction
of the Sandia Heights North subdivision and other later residential subdivisions, and it even entered
into lease agreements to provide for access over reservation land to the Sandia Heights N o d and
other subdivisions located in the Claim Area

Just as the court actually did in Four. Solicitor Tarr was fully justified in considering this
signal default of Plaintiff among the equities affecting its claims.*

*As noted by Solicitor Tm. 'As a mmqwncc. the easmn boundary remained o ~ n l i r l l unquestioned
y
for
over 120 Y ~ M . with the federal. m e and local ~ v m m a r ras
, well as private cidomr. mating the boundary as dram
in the ~ l k e n r survey
s
ar enmly accurate." T& Opinion at26. ~ d m i n Rcc.
.
#1684.
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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be denied to Plaintiff Pueblo of
Sandia on grounds, as urged also by Federal Defendants, that the decision of Secretary Hodel
challenged herein, as well as the underlying opinion of Solicitor Tan, was not arbitrary and
capricious nor otherwise not in accord with law and and that Secretary Babbit's inaction on the
Pueblo's claim does not constitute reviewable final agency action andlor was not arbimry and
-t

-.

capricious; the foregoing is merely confirmatory of the conclusions of Solicitor Tarr. To the eaent
the Court considers extra-record material relied on by Plaintiff in this proceeding. Intervenor

' Defendant respectfully submits the foregoing extra-record materials in opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of a grant of Summary Judgment to Bernalillo
County.
Respectfully submitted.
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